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A moral dilemma occurs when there are several actions which 
cannot all be performed, although each can be and each ought 
to be. Recent discussion of the possibility and implications of 
moral dilemmas has focussed on those dilemmas where the 
sense of ‘can’ at  issue is that which J .L.  Austin called the 
‘all-in’ sense’ and where the ‘ought’ at issue expresses moral 
obligation of the absolute, all-things-considered variety (as 
opposed to  the merely primafacie variety). Given this narrow 
focus, several by-now-familiar arguments for and against the 
possibility of moral dilemmas have been given.2 In this paper I 
shall not add to or evaluate these arguments. Rather, I shall 
draw (in Section I) certain distinctions within the narrow focus 
mentioned, thereby distinguishing four main varieties of moral 
dilemma, and then I shall comment (in Section 11) on the 
possibility and implications of these four main varieties from 
the perspective of the thesis that one ought to do  the best one 
can. 
I 
Even where the type of ‘can’ has been fixed as all-in and the 
type of ‘ought’ as absolute, there is room for further refinement 
of our opening characterization of a moral dilemma. This can 
be achieved by making distinctions concerning times, agents, 
and levels of obligation. 
Consider times first. I t  is now a commonplace that ‘can’- 
statements admit a double time-index, so that it may be said 
of a n  agent that he or she can at some time T, perform some 
action A at some time T, (where T, cannot be later, but may be 
earlier, than T2). In like fashion, ‘ought’-statements admit a 
double time-index, so that it may be said of an agent that he or 
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104 M I C H A E L  J. Z I M M E R M A N  
she ought at TI  to perform A at TI., Suppose that I now 
promise to meet you in Boston tomorrow. Given this promise, 
it may well be that I ought now to be in Boston tomorrow (in 
part because I can now be there then. Had I promised to meet 
you on the moon tomorrow, it would not be the case that I 
now ought t o  be there then.) 
Traditionally, it seems, it has been implicitly supposed that 
the ‘oughts’ which conflict when there is a dilemma are 
operative a t  exactly the same time. That is, the form of a 
dilemma seems traditionally to have been supposed to be this 
(where S is an individual agent): 
(1 )  (a) S ought at  TI to d o  A at T,, 
(b) S ought at  TI  to do  B at T,, 
(c) S can at T, do  A at T,, 
(d) S can at  TI  do  B at T,, and 
(e) S cannot at  T, both d o  A at  T, and do  B at T,.4 
The conflict pictured here is assumed, solely for the sake of 
simplicity of exposition, to obtain between two actions only. 
In general, dilemmas may be envisaged where the conflict 
obtains between n actions, for any integer n greater than one. 
In addition, (1 )  of course presupposes that TI  is not later than 
either T, or T,; the relation between T, and T, is left open, 
however. Let us call a dilemma of the sort depicted in ( 1 )  a 
basic dilemma. 
It is basic dilemmas that have been the focus of most recent 
discussion. Alleged instances of such dilemmas are Sartre’s 
classic case of a young man who can either join the Free French 
or stay at home with his ailing mother (but not both), the case 
of Agamemnon, who can either satisfy his obligation as a 
commander or satisfy his obligation as a father (but not both), 
and so on. But not all dilemmas are basic. The times of the 
conflicting ‘oughts’ may be distinct. In such a case we would 
have this: 
(2) (a) S ought at T I  to do  A at  T,, 
(b) S ought at  T, to do  B at  T,, 
(c) S can at T, do  A at T,, 
(d) S can at  T, do  B a t  T,, and 
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L A P S E S  A N D  D I L E M M A S  105 
(e) S cannot at T, both do A at T, and do B at T,. 
Here it is assumed that TI  is earlier than T,, while T, is not later 
than either T, or T,. The time of ‘can’ in clause (c) (and of 
‘cannot’ in clause (e)) is specified as T,, so that it is clear that 
doing A at T, remains an option for S at T,. It is this which, I 
believe, warrants calling S’s predicament in (2) a sort of 
dilemma. Let us call a dilemma of this sort a bind.5 
Here is one rather mundane example of a way in which, it 
might be alleged, a bind can be generated. Suppose that at TI I 
am invited to attend a party in your honor a t  T,, and that I 
ought then to accept the invitation and attend. But suppose 
that I decline the invitation and am subsequently (at T,) invited 
to attend a party in someone else’s honor at T,. Given the 
locations and times of the parties, I cannot attend both and, we 
may suppose, given my declination of the first invitation, I 
ought at T, to attend the second party. 
So far we have been concerned with dilemmas in which the 
conflicting ‘oughts’ pertain to one and the same individual. But 
it is conceivable that a predicament of the following sort 
should rise: 
(3) (a) S,  ought at TI to do A at T,, 
(b) S, ought at TI to do B at T,, 
(c) S,  can at TI  do A at T,, 
(d) S, can at TI  do B at T,, and 
(e) S,  and S, cannot jointly a t  T, both d o  A at T, and do 
B at T,. 
An example of how such an interpersonal dilemma might 
allegedly come about is this. Suppose that you and I are in a 
position to save a drowning man. What we ought to do is get in 
a boat and row out to him. It would take two of us to do this, 
however, and I refuse to budge. There is still a means, less 
efficient but workable, for each of us to save him singly, 
though, and that is to run out on the jetty and throw him a 
rope. But the jetty is very flimsy and will support the weight of 
at most one of us. In light of my refusal to budge (and of your 
inability to get me to budge), what you ought to do is go out on 
the jetty and throw the rope. But you too refuse to budge, and 
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106 M I C H A E L  J .  Z I M M E R M A N  
in light of this refusal (and my inability to get you to budge), 
this is also what 1 ought to do.6 
Finally, a fourth variety of dilemma can be discerned if we 
allow for levels or orders of obligation. The form of such a 
dilemma is this: 
(4) (a) S ought, at  T ,  to do  A at T,, 
(b) S ought, at TI to do  B at  T,, 
(c) S can at T I  do A at T,, 
(d) S can at T I  do  B at  T,, and 
(e) S cannot at  TI  both do  A at T, and do B at T,. 
Such a dilemma may be called a subsidiary dilemma and might 
allegedly arise in such a way as this. I ought now to attend a 
meeting on the first floor of my office building, but I refuse to 
do  so. I also have the conditional obligation to attend a 
meeting on the second floor, if I fail to attend the meeting on 
the first floor. I cannot attend both meetings. In light of my 
refusal to attend the meeting on the first floor, an 
unconditional obligation to attend the meeting on the second 
floor is detached from the conditional obligation to do  so. But 
we cannot say that my obligation to attend the meeting on the 
second floor is of the same order as that to attend the meeting 
on the first floor, for two reasons. First, it just is not of the 
same order; what I ‘really’ ought to do  is attend the meeting on 
the first floor. Second, if it were of the same order, I would be 
faced with a basic dilemma, and, whatever we think about the 
possibility of such dilemmas, we ought not to think that they 
are so easily come by. Still, we should say that I have an 
obligation of some subsidiary order to attend the meeting on 
the second floor; for, if I fail to do  even that, I will certainly 
have done a double wrong.? 
It should be noted that there are a number of possible 
variations on (1)-(4). First, as noted earlier, each of them is 
confined to a conflict concerning just two actions; but, in 
general, conflicts concerning an indefinite number of actions 
may be formulated. Second, each of (1)-(3) could be modified 
by admitting levels of obligation; and (4) could be refined to 
admit lower levels of obligation. Third, (l),  (2), and (4) could 
each be re-cast so that the ‘oughts’ pertain to agents taken 
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LAPSES A N D  D I L E M M A S  107 
jointly rather than singly; and (3) could be modified (where the 
number of agents at  issue is greater than two) by allowing for 
the conflicting ‘oughts’ to pertain to several agents taken 
jointly (such that they constitute a proper subset of the set of all 
the agents involved in the dilemma) rather than to agents taken 
singly. Fourth, the sort of time-adjustment that ‘turns’ a basic 
dilemma into a bind could be applied also to interpersonal and 
subsidiary dilemmas, so that interpersonal and subsidiary 
binds would result. But to accommodate all of these variations 
would simply complicate the picture and obscure the basic 
underlying structures of the dilemmas, which are those 
presented in (1)-(4). 
I believe that basic dilemmas are impossible. The argument 
that they would require the impossible, namely, that an agent 
be obligated to do  wrong, seems to  me conclusive.8 Moreover, 
the argument that they are ruled out by the principles that 
‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and that, if S ought to do  A and ought to 
do  B, then S ought both to do  A and to do  B, also seems to me 
conclusive.9 The most plausible arguments for their possibility 
seem to me refutable.10 But all of this leaves binds, inter- 
personal dilemmas, and subsidiary dilemmas untouched. 
These types of dilemma seem to me perfectly possible, indeed 
frequently actual. 
To  very many philosophers it has seemed that doing what 
one ought to do  consists in maximizing some sort of achievable 
value. Clearly, consequentialists accept this; but so, too, do 
some deontologists (such as W.D. Ross, who may be said to 
have advocated the maximization of prima facie obligatori- 
ness). We may put this view less pompously as follows: one 
ought to do the best one can. Obviously, there can be and have 
been many variations on this view. I d o  not want to pursue 
these here. What I want to do, rather, is show how this very 
common-and, in my opinion, very plausible-general view of 
the nature of moral obligation accommodates non-basic 
dilemmas while rejecting basic dilemmas. 
That this view rejects basic dilemmas is clear, at  least when it 
is supplemented with this common rider: when there is a tie 
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I08 M I C H A E L  J .  Z I M M E R M A N  
between alternatives in terms of maximization of value, 
neither action is obligatory but each is permissible.!* But that 
the view accommodates non-basic dilemmas is perhaps not 
immediately clear. On investigation, however, it turns out to 
accommodate them in a most intriguing way; for it implies 
that, while such dilemmas are indeed possible, they can arise 
only by way of some wrongdoing. The view thus gives detailed 
expression to the traditional Thomist distinction, much 
neglected by modern philosophers, between a perplexity 
simpliciter and a perplexity secundum quid. 12 The distinction 
may be broadly described in this way: a perplexity simpliciter 
arises if, through no wrongdoing on anyone’s part, it happens 
that whatever can be done will be wrong; a perplexity 
secundum quid arises, on the other hand, if it happens that 
whatever can be done will be wrong, but this predicament has 
been induced by some wrongdoing on someone’s part. Alan 
Donagan, one of the few philosophers to  have entertained this 
distinction in recent years, claims, as does Aquinas, that 
morality would be inconsistent if it admitted perplexities 
simpliciter but not if it admitted perplexities secundum quid; 
he claims further that morality is not inconsistent, and so does 
not admit perplexities simpliciter, although it does admit 
perplexities secundum quid. 13 In this he echoes Georg von 
Wright, who puts the point picturesquely as follows: 
[Plredicament, though logically possible, can only arise 
through antecedent sin .... It is only as a consequence of a 
fall that a man can come to be in a predicament.14 
Von Wright talks of the agent’s situation before the ‘fall’ as 
‘prelapsarian.’ Let us say that (29-(4) in the last section describe 
three different types of predicament into which agents may 
enter by way of a moral lapse. 
It is no accident that the illustrations which accompany the 
presentation of (2)-(4) involve the agent(s) doing wrong. The 
illustration of a bind has it that I wrongly decline the invitation 
to the party in your honor. Such a lapse is required by the view 
that one ought to do the best one can; for only by way of such a 
lapse is it possible that what formerly was best (attending the 
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LAPSES A N D  DILEMMAS 109 
party in your honor) no longer is so. Had I not deviated from 
the strait and narrow (departed from the path of righteousness, 
made a turn for the worse) by declining the invitation, 
attending the other party would not have become the best 
thing for me to do; it would have remained second-best.15 But, 
given the deviation on to a different path, attending the party 
in your honor drops from first- to second-best. Hence I 
become obligated to attend the other party; but hence 
also-and this is very important-I am no longer obligated to 
attend the party in your honor. My lapse does nor generate a 
basic dilemma; perhaps strangely, but nonetheless consistently, 
while I can still attend the party in your honor, if I do  not do so 
the wrong in not doing so has alreadv been achieved (by way of 
the lapse accomplished by my declination of the invitation).l6 
At no time, then, is it inevitable that I do  wrong. Prior to the 
lapse, the lapse was not inevitable; after the lapse, I can still do  
what I ought no" to do, namely, attend the other party. 
The case of interpersonal dilemmas is somewhat different. 
In the illustration, neither you nor I do  what we ought; for each 
of us fails to run on to the jetty and throw the drowning man 
the rope. Now, it is true that we cannot both do  this; but the 
only reason why doing this is obligatory for each of us is that 
we fail t o  do  what wejointly ought to do, namely, row the boat. 
There is nothing inevitable about this failure, in the sense that 
it is open to us jointly to avoid it, even though neither of us can 
singly do  it and neither of us can get the other to cooperate. 
What we have here, then, is a joint wrongdoing generating an 
interpersonal dilemma. (In general, just as one ought singly to 
do  the best one can singly, so too, I would say, several persons 
ought jointly to  do the best they ~anjoint1y.I~) Moreover, on!)! 
when there is such a joint wrongdoing can such a dilemma 
arise. (Note that here, as opposed to the case of binds, the 
wrongdoing need not be antecedent to the dilemma, although 
it may be.) Had you and I rowed the boat, it would not have 
been obligatory for each of us to throw the rope. On the 
contrary, our individual obligations would have coincided 
with our joint obligation; for the best achievable by an 
individual singly can be no better than the best achievable by 
that individual and some other(s) jointly.18 
Finally, it is clear that subsidiary dilemmas can arise only 
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110 MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN 
when there is wrongdoing. (Here the wrongdoing cannot be 
antecedent to the dilemma, if the dilemma is not to constitute a 
bind.) The obligation to attend the meeting on the second floor 
arises only out of my failure to satisfy the obligation to attend 
the meeting on the first floor. Were I to do what I ought, to do, 
it would never be the case that I ought, to do differently.19 And, 
again, there is nothing inevitable about my situation; for I can 
do what I ought, to  do. 
It may seem that there is something phony or  devitalized 
about non-basic dilemmas, at least as 1 have described their 
nature and their genesis. For they may not seem genuinely 
dilemmatic, in that none of them involves the inevitability of 
wrongdoing. I am sympathetic with this observation. It seems 
to me, nonetheless, that binds and interpersonal dilemmas are 
not improperly called dilemmas, although I acknowledge that 
to call subsidiary dilemmas dilemmas may well be stretching 
the term 'dilemma' unacceptably. But I d o  not want to get 
caught up on how to use a word; the important point is simply 
that each of the non-basic dilemmas, as I have called them, 
satisfies the opening characterization of a dilemma as well as a 
basic dilemma does. 
Of course, it could be argued both that lapses can generate 
basic dilemmas and that non-basic dilemmas (or some of them, 
anyway) can be generated by non-lapses. While some 
philosophers seem to accept the first claim20, I would reject it 
for the reason that basic dilemmas seem to me impossible, no 
matter how they might be generated. Again, I would rely here 
on arguments given by others. As for the second claim, I would 
reject it for the reason that I subscribe to the view that one 
ought to do the best one can. But 1 have not argued for this 
view, and I acknowledge that a different view might imply that 
the second claim is true.21 
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